Barak’s No-Lose Peace Strategy

TEL AVIV — The tranquil atmosphere and seclusion of the presidential retreat at Camp David, Md., are certainly not those of a casino. But to most political observers, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, by attending the Camp David summit, turned himself into a gambler who has already lost his fortune and is left with only a dollar in his pocket.

Last week, Barak lost his parliamentary majority when four small parties defected from his coalition government, and his foreign minister, David Levy, refused to travel with him to Camp David. Barak’s coalition has shrunk to 25% of the 120 members of the Knesset. Meanwhile, the Israeli economy is not lifting off. And despite a big push from President Bill Clinton, Barak couldn’t make peace with Syria because Hafez Assad, its late president, was too stubborn to compromise. The Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon is Barak’s only clear success, and that was marred by acrimonious second-guessing. In addition, the Israeli leader is trapped between Palestinian threats to begin a new round of violence if their demands are unmet and intimidating tactics orchestrated by Israel’s right wing aimed at rallying the country against any decision it may dislike. Barak’s determination to attend the summit with Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat and Clinton may thus seem suicidal.

The Israeli prime minister is anything but. Indeed, Barak regards the deliberations at Camp David as the “summit which will end all summits.” He expects the meeting to produce clear-cut, tangible results that will end 100 years of Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He talks of a package deal: Israel will withdraw from the remaining occupied parts of Gaza and the West Bank, handing over 90%-95% of the land to the Palestinian Authority. This would mean dismantling nearly 50 of 120 Jewish settlements, relocating 60,000 inhabitants and creating enclaves within the Palestinian state controlled by and annexed to Israel. Israel will also recognize the Palestinian state, which would have all the symbols of an independent country, except an army: an internationally recognized government, police force, central bank, currency, diplomatic missions and a seat at the United Nations.

In return, Arafat must declare the Palestinian struggle and war against the “Jewish State” over. He must abandon the “right of return” for the 2 million to 3 million Palestinian refugees, and their families, of the 1948 war, now scattered in Arab countries and around the globe. This “right” has been mythologized in the Palestinian narrative of history. Most difficult for the Palestinian leader, however, is the Israeli demand that he accept Jerusalem, with its occupied and annexed Arab sectors, as Israel’s undivided capital. If Arafat succumbs to the near-synchronized Israeli-American pressure, he will have to settle for less than the formula of “peace for land” that Egypt and Jordan got in return for their treaties with Israel.

It will be difficult for Arafat to accept the package deal. He, too, has his troubles back home, including a strong challenge from Muslim fundamentalists who oppose any agreement with the “Jewish enemy” and from Palestinian refugees who fear betrayal and marginalization.

Conventional wisdom says that Barak has set unrealistic goals, and that the summit will not yield an agreement. Yet, Barak’s gamble is really a well-calculated and shrewd political maneuver. Regardless of the summit’s results, Barak may well emerge a winner.

This would obviously be true if he achieves his goals. He will have secured his place in history as a daring and imaginative leader who rose above the hurly-burly of ordinary Israeli politics to stop a century-old conflict that many regard as unresolvable. If a peace accord is signed, it’s expected to be approved in national referendums, which both Barak and Arafat are committed to call. Pollsters believe that 52%-55% of Israelis will say “yes” to the peace deal. Israeli politicians will most probably line up accordingly, enabling Barak to form a new coalition government along the same party lines of center-left and the ultraorthodox. His most challenging task will be to dismantle Jewish settlements and relocate their settlers. Some may resist with force.

If Barak achieves only 70% of his goals, he will still be embraced by the majority of Israelis as a peace hero. As with the Camp David accord of 1978, signed by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Israeli Premier Menachem Begin and President Jimmy Carter, a “framework” agreement signed by Barak, Arafat and Clinton would leave the tough issues of Jerusalem and the refugees for future negotiations. Public-opinion polls already show that a majority of Israelis and 65% of Palestinians will support almost any deal. These surveys indicate that despite the threats of extremists on both sides, Israelis and Palestinians alike want to lead normal lives, and that wars and violence have no place in their dreams.

Even if Barak returned without a peace treaty, he would still receive a hero’s welcome. He would be applauded by national chauvinists as a leader who stood up to pressure and refused to surrender Israel’s national interests. According to this scenario, a summit failure will provoke Palestinian outrage, which could escalate into a military confrontation with Israel. That, in turn, may lead to a new national unity government of Labor, renamed Israel One, and Likud, led by Ariel Sharon. Currently, Sharon’s leadership is being challenged by former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who faces charges of corruption. To join Barak’s government may be Sharon’s last chance to hold a Cabinet office.